Private-Sector Credit in Central & Eastern Europe: New (Over) Shooting Stars? by Égert, Balázs et al.
 
  
 
THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private-Sector Credit in Central & Eastern 
Europe: New (Over) Shooting Stars? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: Balázs Égert , Peter Backé and Tina Zumer  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 852 
November 2006 Private-Sector Credit in Central and Eastern Europe: New
(Over)Shooting Stars?
BalÆzs ￿gerty Peter BackØz Tina Zumer￿
Abstract
This paper analyzes the equilibrium level of private credit to GDP in 11 Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries in order to see whether the high credit growth
recently observed in some of these countries led to above equilibrium private credit-
to-GDP levels. We use estimation results obtained for a panel of small open OECD
economies (out-of-sample sample) to derive the equilibrium credit level for a panel
of transition economies (in-sample panel). We opt for this (out-of-sample) approach
because the coef￿cient estimates for transition economies are fairly unstable. We
show that there is a large amount of uncertainty to determine the equilibrium level
of private credit. Yet our results indicate that a number of countries are very close or
even above the estimated equilibrium levels, whereas others are still well below the
equilibrium level.
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11 Introduction
The emerging literature on credit growth in transition economies has documented that lending to
the private sector has recently grown dynamically in a number of transition economies.
1 This
can be attributed to a number of factors, including macroeconomic stabilization, comprehensive
reforms and privatization in the ￿nancial sector, the introduction of market institutions and legal
reforms. However, given the size of the recent boom in bank lending in Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) some commentators have questioned whether the growth rates recorded in these countries
can be viewed as sustainable in the medium to long run.
In order to answer this question, this paper investigates the determinants of domestic credit to
the private sector as a percentage of GDP in 11 CEE countries
2 as well as the equilibrium level
of private credit-to-GDP ratio. We have tested our empirical speci￿cations for a variety of panels
composed of (1) transition economies, (2) developed small and large OECD countries and (3)
emerging market economies from Asia and the Americas.
The use of these panels provides some interesting perspectives. First, in-sample panels give
useful insights regarding the major determinants of credit-to-GDP levels in CEE. Second, as ￿nan-
cial depth in most transition economies remains comparatively low, it might well be that private
credit-to-GDP ratios have still remained below their equilibrium levels for most of the last decade.
This would give rise to a bias in the econometric estimates, as credit-to-GDP ratios tend to con-
verge toward their equilibrium levels.
3 To overcome this problem, we could use estimates obtained
from panels composed of small open OECD and emerging market economies from Asia and the
Americas to obtain the equilibrium credit-to-GDP ratios for 11 CEE countries.
1 See e.g. Cottarelli, Dell’Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar (2003), Schadler (2005), BackØ and Zumer (2005), Duen-
wald, Gueorguiev and Schaechter (2005), Pazarba‚ s￿o￿ glu et al. (2005), Coricelli, Mucci and Revoltella (2006) and
Hilbers, Otker-Robe and Pazarba‚ s￿o￿ glu (2006).
2 Countries included are Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ro-
mania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
3 An analogous line of reasoning is applied in the literature on equilibrium exchange rates of CEE countries (Maeso-
Fernandez, Osbath and Schnatz, 2005).
2The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some stylized facts regarding credit growth
in the transition economies. Section 3 brie￿y overviews the relevant literature, sketches the issue of
initialundershootingandovershootingofthecredit-to-GDPratio, andexaminestheirconsequences
for econometric testing. Section 4 presents the economic speci￿cation used for the estimations and
describes the dataset and the estimation techniques. Section 5 then presents and discusses the
estimation results. Finally, Section 6 draws some concluding remarks.
2 Some Stylized Facts
To place credit developments in transition economies into context, it is useful to recall that ￿nancial
systems in these countries are bank-based ￿ about 85% of ￿nancial sector assets are bank assets
￿ and that capital markets (in particular corporate bond and stock market segments) are generally
not very developed. This implies that bank credit is the main source of external ￿nancing in these
countries, although foreign direct investment (FDI) has also been important in some countries.
Banking sectors in transition economies in CEE have undergone a comprehensive transformation
in the past 15 years or so, including wide-ranging reforms of their regulatory frameworks and
supervisory arrangements, bank consolidation schemes and ￿ in almost all countries ￿ sweeping
privatization of ￿nancial institutions, mainly to foreign strategic owners (mostly ￿nancial insti-
tutions based in ￿old￿ EU Member States). Consequently, the governance of banks has greatly
improved, and the performance and health of these banking sectors have advanced substantially, as
standard prudential indicators show.
4
In 2005, the banking systems’ capital adequacy ratios in the 11 countries ranged from 10.6%
(Slovenia)to20.3%(Romania), withanunweightedaverageofabout13%, wellabovethestatutory
minimum of 8% prescribed by the Basel rules. Pro￿tability has risen considerably, as return on
equity data show, and is now above the EU average (about 13%) in most countries covered in this
4 On recent assessments of banking sector performance and strength in CEE countries see e.g. ECB (2005a, 2005b
and 2006), EBRD (2005), IMF (2005a, 2005b and 2006), IMF Financial System Stability Assessments
(http://www.imf.org/external/NP/fsap/fsap.asp).
3study (see Chart 1). Asset quality has improved, as non-performing loan ratios have fallen (see
Chart 1). Reserves and provisions now cover a considerable part of substandard assets in most
of the countries under review here, as coverage ratios ranged from 60% to 100% in 2005 in most
cases, with an unweighted average of about 85%.
5
Chart 1. Return on Equity and Nonperforming Loans
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Note: Return on equity: Slovakia: value 2000 (instead of 1998); Romania: value 1999 (instead of 1998); Latvia: value 2004 (instead of 2005)
Nonperforming loans: Latvia: value 2004 (instead of 2005); no data available for Lithuania
Chart 2 gives an overview of the development of credit to the private sector in percent of GDP
from the early 1990s to 2004. Several observations can be made on the basis of chart 1. Some
countries, namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia, started transition
with low credit-to-GDP ratios of around 20%. Estonia and Latvia then recorded a marked increase
in the ratio, and the credit-to-GDP ratio also rose steadily in Slovenia from the early 1990s to
2004 although the overall increase was less pronounced than in the two aforementioned Baltic
countries. Credit growth has picked up only recently in Lithuania and Romania, and for Poland,
only a moderate increase can be observed during the second half of the period studied.
5 Romania (15%) and Hungary (44%) are outliers in this respect. It should be noted, however, that a low cov-
erage ratio is not necessarily problematic, as it can to some extent re￿ect the classi￿cation and composition of
non-performing assets. Moreover, a high level of capitalization may provide an alternative cushion if the cov-
erage ratio of reserves and provisions is low.
4Chart 2. Bank Credit to the Private Sector as a Percentage of GDP, 1990 to 2004
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Central and Eastern Europe - 5
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South Eastern Europe
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data drawn from the IFS/IMF. For precise data de￿nitions, see Section 4.2.
By contrast, the second group of countries, notably Croatia and Hungary, started transition with
higher credit-to-GDP ratios than the Baltic countries. After dropping considerably to close to 20%,
the ratio started to increase, reaching pretransition levels in Hungary and growing to levels well
exceeding 40% in Croatia by 2004.
The third group of countries, comprising Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, had the
5highest credit-to-GDP ratio at the beginning of the period (between 60% and 80%). For Bulgaria,
this ratio came down to 10% in 1997, while expanding to close to 40% by 2004.
6 The Czech
Republic and Slovakia also recorded a substantial contraction (to nearly 30% for both countries),
while the ratios seem to have stabilized during the last couple of years.
The differences in initial credit-to-GDP levels can be traced largely to different approaches with
respect to the ￿nancing of (credit to) enterprises under central planning across countries as well
as strongly diverging in￿ation (price level adjustment) patterns across countries at the initial stage
of transition. In turn, major temporary contractions in credit-to-GDP ratios during the transition
process have mainly been due to banking consolidation measures, by which nonperforming assets
were removed from banks’ balance sheets. Such nonperforming assets (mostly loans) had either
been inherited from the previous era of central planning or were built up in the early transition
years, when banking systems were still immature, ￿awed by inadequate regulation, connected
lending and simple lack of experience.
3 The Equilibrium Level of Private Credit
3.1 Literature Overview
Several theoretical and empirical studies have dealt with credit growth, ￿nancial deepening and
lending booms. One body of literature on credit growth reviews the determinants of credit demand
andcreditsupply. Inthemodelsoncreditdemand, realGDP,pricesandinterestratesarecommonly
the explanatory variables, although there is no ￿standard￿ model is widely used. On the supply
side, a variety of credit channel models consider how changes in the ￿nancial positions of banks
(bank lending channel) and borrowers (balance sheet channel) affect the availability of credit in an
6 Note that the peculiar and rather fuzzy pattern of the credit-to-GDP ratio in Bulgaria shown in chart 1 is not
due to data problems but, to a considerable extent, driven by exchange rate movements. The ratio rose sharply in
1994, 1996 and 1997 because of the depreciation of the domestic currency vis-￿-vis the U.S. dollar, considering
that a signi￿cant share of credit was denominated in foreign currency (mainly U.S. dollars). Correction of the credit
ratiooccurredinthepost-crisisperiodbecauseoftheappreciationofthedomesticcurrencyandbecauseofthewrite-off
of nonperforming loans.
6economy (see Hall, 2001, for a succinct overview). However, modeling and estimation techniques
in this area are complicated due to dif￿culties in separating demand-side effects from supply-side
effects (see e.g. Rajan 1994).
Regarding the relationship between credit and growth, there are strong empirical indications
of a positive interaction between the two, usually with elasticity higher than one in the long run.
This implies that credit-to-GDP levels rise as per capita GDP increases, a process which is denoted
as ￿nancial deepening (see Terrones and Mendoza, 2004 for a concise overview). In addition,
empirical studies have examined the direction of causality; with most results suggesting that it is
￿nancial deepening which spurs economic development (see e.g. Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000,
and Rajan and Zingales, 2001 for an overview). While the results of this literature are appealing, it
is dif￿cult to establish genuine causality, while nonlinearities in the relationship between ￿nancial
development and growth as well as country heterogeneity add to the problems of empirical analysis
in this area (see discussion in Favara, 2003).
The literature on lending booms has identi￿ed four main triggers: (i) real business cycles caused
by technological or terms-of-trade shocks (with highly pro-cyclical output elasticity of credit de-
mand), (ii) ￿nancial liberalization of an initially repressed ￿nancial system, (iii) capital in￿ows
triggered by external factors, and (iv) wealth shocks originating from comprehensive structural re-
forms (see Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche (2001) for a survey). In addition, less than fully
credible policies (in particular exchange rate-based stabilizations) can also play a role in spurring
credit booms, by setting off an unsustainable consumption boom (see Calvo and Vegh (1999) for
a review). Moreover, the ￿nancial acceleration literature, including the more recent literature on
credit cycles, gives some theoretical insights into the mechanisms that drive or amplify credit ex-
pansions, which turn out to be non-sustainable and thus ultimately require a correction (Terrones
and Mendoza, 2004). There is little evidence in the empirical literature that lending booms typ-
ically lead to ￿nancial crises. As Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche. (2001) point out, while
the conditional probability of a lending boom occurring before a ￿nancial crisis may be quite high,
7this does not tell us much about the converse, i.e. the conditional probability that a ￿nancial crisis
will follow a lending boom.
7
3.2 Initial Under- and Overshooting in Transition Economies
The question of whether or not credit growth in transition economies is excessive is closely related
to the issue of what the equilibrium level of the stock of bank credit to the private sector as a share
of GDP in those countries is. In this study, we de￿ne the equilibrium level of private credit as the
level of private credit, which would be justi￿ed by the economic fundamentals. Deviations from
the equilibrium level occur if changes in the private credit-to-GDP ratio cannot be explained by
changes in the economic fundamentals (so-called undershooting and overshooting). Hence, our
notion of equilibrium is very close to the one used for instance in the literature on equilibrium ex-
change rates (Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate - BEER) and in other ￿elds of the economic
profession.
8
Chart 3 demonstrate when moving from point A through B to C, the level of private credit
increases as a function of the underlying fundamentals. The depicted trajectory of the increase in
the credit-to-GDP ratio (credit growth) can be thought of as an equilibrium phenomenon.
However, we may also think of a situation when the observed credit-to-GDP ratio is out of
tune with economic fundamentals. For example, Point A’ depicts the situation when the initial
credit-to-GDP ratio is higher than what the level of economic development would justify (initial
overshooting), whereas Point A￿ shows where this ratio is lower (initial undershooting). In these
cases, credit growth should differ from the equilibrium rate of growth, and this would secure the
7 The ￿nancial accelerator literature, including the more recent literature on credit cycles, gives some theoretical
insights into the mechanisms that drive or amplify credit expansions, which later on turn out to be non-sustainable and
thus ultimately require a correction. Overshooting, to give just one example, may occur if bank managers follow
overly loose credit policies in order to boost current bank earnings at the expense of future earnings. Moreover,
as information externalities make banks’ credit policies interdependent, banks coordinate and tighten credit policy
in the event of an adverse shock to borrowers (Rajan, 1994).
8 Note that our de￿nition of equilibrium is not suitable for analyzing the connection between credit growth and exter-
nal sustainability, ￿nancial stability aspects of credit growth or the optimal currency (foreign currency vs. do-
mestic currency) or sectoral (households vs. corporate sector) composition of the credit-to-GDP ratio.
8return to the equilibrium level of the credit-to-GDP ratio.
9
Initial undershooting (Point A￿) may be important for transition economies, most of which
started their economic transformation process with lower levels of credit-to-GDP ratios than other
countries at the same level of development would have in other parts of the world. This is the
heritage of central planning as under the Communist regimes the ￿nancial sector was underdevel-
oped. Hence, once economic transformation from central planning to market is completed, higher
credit growth in the transition economies may partly re￿ect the correction from this initial under-
shooting to the equilibrium level of the credit-to-GDP ratio. This is shown in Chart 3, where the
move from A￿ to B can be decomposed into (a) equilibrium credit growth, given by A￿ to B￿, and
(b) the adjustment from initial undershooting to equilibrium (from B￿ to B). However, in cases of
high credit growth rates, the increase in credit to GDP may be even higher than justi￿ed by the
equilibrium change and the correction from the initial undershooting. The move from A￿ to B’ on
Chart 3 indicates such an overshooting, where the excessive increase in credit to GDP is given by
the distance between B and B’.
3.3 The Consequences of an Initial Under- or Overshooting
If there is initial undershooting or overshooting at the beginning of the transition process and if
the adjustment toward equilibrium occurs gradually (implying persistent initial undershooting or
overshooting), the use of panels that only include transition economies may lead to severely biased
constant terms and coef￿cient estimates, as put forward in the context of equilibrium exchange
rates by Maeso-Fernandez, Osbat and Schnatz (2005). When regressing the observed credit-to-
GDP ratio moving from A￿ to B (instead of the equilibrium change from A to B) on a set of
fundamentals, the slope coef￿cient would suffer from an obvious upward bias. By the same token,
the constant term will be lower than it would be in the absence of an initial undershooting.
9 In both cases, credit growth is expressed in terms of GDP. For example, credit growth ([C(t)-C(t-1)]/C(t-1) is higher
for countries with lower credit-to-GDP levels than for countries with higher credit-to-GDP levels if both countries
have similar credit-to-GDP ￿ows. Hence, it is more appropriate to relate changes in credit to the GDP to avoid
this distortion (Arpa, Reininger and Walko, 2005), as we do in this study.
9This is why it is advisable to use panels including countries which do not exhibit an initial
undershooting or overshooting in the credit-to-GDP ratio or to use out-of-sample panels for the
analysis of the equilibrium level of the credit-to-GDP ratio of transition economies.
Chart 3. The Evolution of the Credit-to-GDP Ratio
Bank credit to the private sector (as % of GDP)
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3.4 The Empirical Literature on Transition Economies
Cottarelli, Dell’Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar (2005) were the ￿rst to estimate a model of the long-
term relationship between the private sector credit/GDP ratio and a set of variables (see table 1)
for a panel of non-transition economies. Subsequently, they produce out-of-sample estimates for
private sector credit/GDP ratios of 15 CEE countries. As actual private sector credit-to-GDP levels
were considerably lower in 2002 than the authors’ estimates of the expected long-term credit/GDP
ratios they conclude that private-sector bank credit levels in that year were not inconsistent with
the structural characteristics of the economies under examination.
10We are aware of two other recent studies, which also investigate the equilibrium level of private
credit and the possible ￿excessiveness￿ of credit growth in transition economies. Boissay, Calvo-
Gonzalez and Kozluk (2006) ￿rst estimate time series models including GDP-per-capita and real
interest rates for a number of established market economies for periods with stable credit-to-GDP
ratios. They then compare the average of the credit growth rates for transition economies obtained
using the error correction speci￿cations estimated for the developed countries with the observed
credit growth in the transition economies. They also estimate time series models for transition
economies, which include the real interest rate, a quadratic trend and a dummy aimed at capturing
changes in credit growth after 2001. Their results indicate excessive credit growth in the three
Baltic States and in Bulgaria and to a lesser extent also in Hungary and Croatia. At the same time,
credit growth in Romania and Slovenia seems to be non-excessive.
10
The study by Kiss, Nagy and VonnÆk (2006) estimates a dynamic panel (Pooled Mean Group
Estimator) model including GDP-per-capita, real interest rate and in￿ation of 11 euro area coun-
tries (excluding Luxembourg) to generate out-of-sample estimates for private sector credit-to-GDP
ratios of the three Baltic countries and of the CEE-5 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia). They ￿nd that only Estonia and Latvia may have come close recently to equilibrium
while the other countries have credit-to-GDP ratios below the estimated equilibrium levels. Be-
sides being above the estimated equilibrium credit level, they de￿ne two other criteria which may
indicate a credit boom: (a) if the observed credit growth exceeds the one implied by the long-run
equilibrium relationship and (b) if the observed growth rate is higher than the speed of adjustment
to equilibrium in the error-correction model. Overall, they ￿nd that the risk of a credit boom is high
10 Two observations come to mind with regard to this paper. First, the quadratic trend may capture missing vari-
ables from their model (which indeed only contains real interest rates) and explosive trends due to credit boom or to ad-
justment from initial undershooting of credit levels. It is in fact surprising to see that a sizeable number of coun-
tries have excessive credit growth given that the quadratic trend has a very good ￿t thus leaving very little unex-
plainedvariationinthecreditseries. Second, theauthorsuseEuriborfortheironlymacroeconomicvariable, therealin-
terest rate. This may be problematic because some foreign currency denominated loans are linked to other curren-
cies than the euro for instance in Hungary but also because Euribor neglects the country risk and default risk at the mi-
cro level.
11in both Estonia and Latvia according to these criteria, whereas Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia
might be in the danger zone because the observed growth rates are higher than the one derived
from the long-run equilibrium relationship. In addition, they argue that possible credit booms are
mainly due to credit expansion to households and not to the non￿nancial corporate sector.
11
We contribute to this literature by expanding the list of countries (11 transition, OECD and
emerging market economies), the list of explanatory variables, by constructing carefully sev-
eral possible benchmark country groups which share common characteristics with the transition
economies (emerging markets, small emerging markets, small and open OECD countries) and by
performing extensive sensitivity analysis of the estimation results.
4 Economic and Econometric Speci￿cations
4.1 The Empirical Model
Most studies investigating credit growth employ a simple set of explanatory variables (see Table
1), which usually includes GDP per capita or real GDP, some kind of (real or nominal) interest rate
and the in￿ation rate (Calza et al., 2001, 2003; Brzoza-Brzezina, 2005; Boissay, Calvo-Gonzalez
and Kozluk, 2006 and Kiss, Nagy and VonnÆk, 2006). Hofmann (2001) extends this list by house
prices, a very important variable, because a rise in house prices is usually accompanied by an
increase in credit to the private sector.
Cottarelli et al. (2005) use indicators capturing factors that drive the private credit-to-GDP ratio.
These variables describe the degree of ￿nancial liberalization, the quality and implementation of
accounting standards, entry restrictions to the banking sector and the origin of the legal system.
Finally, they use a measure of public debt aimed at analyzing possible crowding-out (or crowding-
in) effects.
11 It may be noted that the two additional criteria used by the authors have some drawbacks. First, the observed
growth rates may be in excess of the one derived from the long-run equilibrium relationship because of the adjustment
from initial undershooting. Second, the speed of adjustment to equilibrium differs if the actual observations are
below or above the estimated equilibrium.
12Table 1. Overview of Papers Analyzing the Determinants of Credit Growth
Authors Dependent variable Explanatory variables
Calza et al. (2001) Real loans
GDP per capita in PPS, short-term
and long-term real interest rates
Hofmann (2001) Real loans Real GDP, real interest rate, housing prices
Calza et al. (2003) Real loans
Real GDP growth, nominal lending rate,
in￿ation rate
Brzoza-Brzezina (2005) Real loans Real GDP growth, real interest rate
Cottarelli et al. (2005)
Credit to the private
sector (%GDP)
GDP per capita in PPS, in￿ation rate,
￿nancial liberalisation index,
accounting standards,
entry restrictions to the banking sector,
German origin of legal system, public debt
Boissay et al. (2006)
Credit to the private
sector (%GDP)
GDP per capita, real interest rate (Euribor),
quadratic trend
Kiss et al. (2006)
Credit to the private
sector (%GDP)
GDP per capita, real interest rate
in￿ation rate
Note: GDP per capita in PPS (purchasing power standards) is obtained by converting GDP per capita ￿gures using
the nominal exchange rate given by the domestic and foreign price levels (P/P*).
The economic speci￿cation which we estimate for the private credit-to-GDP ratio relies on
explanatory variables used in previous studies, but also extends them. We consider the following
variables:
1.) GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power standards (PPS) (CAPITA ). An increase
in per capita GDP is expected to result in an increase in credit to the private sector. Alternatively,
we also use real GDP (gdpr ) and industrial production (ip ) to check for the robustness of the GDP
per capita variable and to see to what extent these variables, which are used interchangeably in the
literature, are substitutes.
2.) Bank credit to the government sector as a percentage of GDP (CG ). As this variable
captures possible crowding-out effects, any increase (decrease) in bank credit to the government
sector is thought to give rise to a decrease (increase) in bank credit to the private sector. It should
be noted that bank credit to the government measures crowding out better than public debt as
employed in Cottarelli et al. (2005), because public debt also includes loans taken out abroad and
13because public entities may well ￿nance themselves on the securities markets. Moreover, public
debt is subject to valuation and stock-￿ow adjustments.
3.) Short-term and long-term nominal lending interest rates (i ). Lower interest rates should
promote credit to the private sector, implying a negative sign for this variable. Calza et al. (2001)
use both short-term and long-term interest rates, arguing that whether either rates play a more
importantroledependsonthe respectiveshareofloanswith￿xedinterestrates andvariableinterest
rates. Because the nominal lending interest rates used in the paper show a high correlation with
short-term interest rates (three-month Treasury bills and money market rates), short-term interest
rates are used as a robustness check rather than as an additional variable.
4.) In￿ation (p ). High in￿ation is thought to be associated with a drop in bank credit to
the private sector. In￿ation is measured both in terms of the producer price index (PPI) and the
consumer price index (CPI).
5.) House prices (phouse ). There are a number of reasons why changes in housing prices
might lead to changes in credit demand. First, increases in housing prices result in a rise in the
total amount which has to be spent to purchase a given residential or commercial property. This
is subsequently re￿ected in an increase in demand for credit through which the higher purchasing
price can be fully or partly ￿nanced. This means that an increase in housing prices may generate
more credit to the private sector. Second, rising housing prices may generate a rise in credit de-
mand of homeowners as higher housing prices increase lifetime wealth according to Modigliani’s
lifecycle theory, which in turn leads to consumption smoothing by means of more borrowing. By
contrast, higher housing prices are usually connected to higher rents, which decrease borrowing
of renters (Hofmann, 2001). Third, credit demand may be affected by housing prices because
Tobin’s q theory is also applicable to the housing market. For example, a higher-than-unity q im-
plies market value above replacement cost, and this promotes construction production, which is
re￿ected in higher demand for loans. Changes in commercial and residential property prices also
have an in￿uence on credit supply. According to the broad lending channel, net wealth, serving as
14collateral for credit, determine the capacity of ￿rms and household to borrow externally. Put dif-
ferently, higher housing prices resulting in rising net wealth increase the amount of credit provided
by banks. Overall, both credit supply and demand bear a positive relationship to housing prices
from a theoretical viewpoint.
However, a fundamental problem arising here is whether price increases in the real estate market
are driven by fundamental factors or whether they re￿ect a bubble. If price developments in the
real estate market mirror changes in fundamentals, such as the quality of housing or adjustments to
the underlying fundamentals, the ensuing rise in the stock of credit can be viewed as an equilibrium
phenomenon. Incontrast, intheeventthathighcreditgrowthisduetothedevelopmentofahousing
price bubble due to speculation, the accompanying credit growth is a disequilibrium phenomenon
from the point of view of long-term credit stock.
6.) The degree of liberalization of the ￿nancial sector, in particular that of the banking
sector. A higher degree of ￿nancial liberalization makes it easier for banks to fund credit supply.
Because the ￿nancial liberalization indices (finlib ) used in Abiad and Mody (2003) and Cottarelli
et al. (2005) only partially match our country and time coverage, we use in addition the spread be-
tween lending and deposit rates to capture ￿nancial liberalization. A decrease in the spread can be
an indication of ￿nancial liberalization in particular if it re￿ects more intensive competition among
banks and also between banks and other ￿nancial intermediaries. It should be noted, however, that
the spread variables could also capture other factors than ￿nancial liberalization.
12 With this caveat
and limitation in mind, spread variables are still the most appropriate variables to capture ￿nancial
liberalization that are available for all the countries in the different panels covered in this study.
7.) Public and private credit registries ( reg). The existence of credit registries diminishes
problems related to asymmetric information and the probability of credit fraud. This in turn leads
12 Notee.g. thattherecentdeclineintheabsolutelevelofspreadsmaybepartlyduetorecordlowglobalinterestrates.
15to an increase in the supply of bank credit, all things being equal.
1314
For some of the variables, it is notoriously dif￿cult to separate whether they in￿uence the de-
mand for or the supply of credit. For instance, GDP per capita and the interest rate variables
could affect both credit demand and supply. These problems were tackled in the literature on the
credit channel by the use of bank- and ￿rm-level data.
15 However, given that we are interested in
aggregated macroeconomic variables, these identi￿cation issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
Our baseline speci￿cation includes per capita GDP, bank credit to the public sector, nominal
lending rates, in￿ation rates and ￿nancial liberalization based on the spread:
C
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where CP is bank credit to the private sector expressed as a share of GDP. In addition, it is
worthwhile checking whether the robustness of the variables included in equation (1) is affected
by the use of alternative measures often used in the literature (e.g. replacing GDP per capita by
real GDP growth and real industrial production, or long-term lending rates by short-term lending
rates, and the PPI by the CPI). These alternative variables are subsequently introduced one by one
in the baseline speci￿cation, which yields ￿ve additional equations.
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13 In contrast to Cottarelli et al. (2005), for econometric reasons, we do not include a variable that captures the
tradition of legal systems of countries, which can affect ￿nancial development. The mean group estimator (MGE)
estimation methods in section 5 do not allow the use of dummy variables that take a value of zero throughout the
entire period.
14 We are aware of the fact that the registry variable may not capture how credit contracts are enforced in courts.
However, even though an easier seizure of collateral by banks may spark credit to households and small ￿rms, such
growth will probably be re￿ected in a one-off spike in growth rates.
15 For an overview, see e.g. Kierzenkowski (2004).
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The sensitivity check to the alternative speci￿cation is then followed by the use of the registry
variable and by the inclusion of house prices:
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4.2 Estimation Methods
The ￿rst step is to check whether our series are stationary in levels. Four panel unit root tests
are applied: the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), the Breitung (2000), the Hadri (2000) and the Im-
Pesaran-Shin (2003) tests. The ￿rst three assume common unit roots across panel members, while
the Im-Pesaran-Shin test allows for cross-country heterogeneity. A further difference is that the
Hadri test tests the null of no unit root against the alternative of a unit root, whereas the remaining
tests take the null of a unit root against the alternative of no unit root.
If the series turn out to be nonstationary in levels but stationary in ￿rst differences, the coef￿-
cients of the long-term relationships for the relationships shown in equations (1) to (9) are derived
using three alternative estimation techniques: a.) ￿xed-effect ordinary least squares (FE_OLS);
b.) panel dynamic OLS estimates (DOLS) and c.) the mean group estimator (MGE) proposed by
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999).
17The panel dynamic OLS, which is the mean group of individual DOLS estimates, accounts for
the endogeneity of the regressors and serial correlation in the residuals in the simple OLS setting by
incorporating leads and lags of the regressors in ￿rst differences. The panel DOLS can be written
for panel member as follows:
Yi:t = ￿0 +
n X
h=1
￿i;h ￿ Xi;t +
n X
h=1
ki;2 X
j=￿ki;1
￿i;h;;j ￿ ￿Xi;h;t￿j + "i;t (9)
where ki;1 and ki;2 denote respectively leads and lags and the cointegrating vector ￿0 contains
the long-term coef￿cients of the explanatory variables (with h = 1;::;n ) for each panel member i.
The mean group estimator (MGE) is based on the error correction form of the ARDL model,
which is given for panel member i as shown in equation (10) where the dependent variable in ￿rst
differences is regressed on the lagged values of the dependent and independent variables in levels
and ￿rst differences:
￿Yi;t = ￿i + ￿i(Yi;t￿1 +
n X
h=1
￿i;hXi;t￿1) +
li;1 X
j=1
￿i;j￿Yi;t￿j +
n X
h=1
li;2 X
j=0
￿i;h;j ￿ ￿Xi;h;t￿j + "i;t (10)
where li;1 and li;2 are the maximum lags. The long-term coef￿cients ( ￿
0) are obtained by
normalizing vector ￿
0 on ￿.
Finally, we use the error correction term (￿) obtained from the error-correction speci￿cation of
the mean group estimator as tests for cointegration. A negative and statistically signi￿cant error
correction term is taken as evidence for the presence of cointegration.
5 Results
5.1 Estimation Results
The estimations are carried out for quarterly data covering 43 countries, which are grouped into
three main panels: (a) developed OECD countries, (b) emerging markets from Asia and the Amer-
18icas
16 and (c) CEE transition economies. The OECD panel is further split into two subpanels: (a)
small OECD countries (excluding transition economies that have joined the OECD)
17, and (b) large
OECD countries.
18 The CEE panel consists of 11 transition economies and is also subdivided into
three presumably more homogeneous groups: (a) the Baltic countries (B-3): Estonia (EE), Latvia
(LV) and Lithuania (LT), (b) the CEE-5: the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL),
Slovakia (SK) and Slovenia (SI), and (c) Southeastern Europe (SEE-3): Bulgaria (BG), Croatia
(HR) and Romania (RO). The sample begins between 1975 and 1980 for the OECD countries,
between 1980 and 1993 for the emerging market economies, and between 1990 and 1996 for the
transition economies; it ends in 2004.
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Panel unit root tests are employed for level data and for ￿rst-differenced data. While the test
results show that most of the series are I(1) processes, in some cases, the tests yield con￿icting
results for level data. However, since the tests do not indicate unambiguously in any case that the
series are stationary in level, we conclude that they are I(1).
20
When analyzing possible long-term relationships between the private credit-to-GDP ratio on
the one hand and the explanatory variables on the other, one has to make sure that the variables
are cointegrated. As explained earlier, the error correction terms (￿ ) issued from the estimated
error correction form of the MGE are used for this purpose. The variables are connected via a
cointegrating vector in the event that the error correction term is statistically signi￿cant and has a
negative sign. According to the results shown in Table 2 below, most of the error correction terms
ful￿ll this double criterion. A notable exception is the panel composed of the three Baltic countries,
16 Argentina (AR), Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), India (IN), Indonesia (ID), Israel (IL), Mexico (MX), Peru (PE), the
Philippines (PH), South Africa (ZA), South Korea (KR), Thailand (TH). Although South Korea and Mexico are OECD
countries, they can be viewed as catching-up emerging market economies for most of the period investigated in this
paper.
17 Austria (AT), Australia (AU), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Ireland
(IE), the Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES) and Sweden (SE).
18 Germany (DE), France (FR), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).
19 The dataset is unbalanced, as the length of the individual data series depends largely on data availability. All
data are transformed into logs. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the source and the time span for variables.
20 These results are not reported in the paper but are available from the authors upon request.
19as there seems to be only one cointegration relationship out of the eight tested equations.
Table 2 Error Correction Terms (￿) from the Mean Group Estimator Estimations, Equation 1 to
Equation 7
Large OECD Small OECD EM CEE-11 CEE-5 B-3 SEE
Eq.1 -0.094*** -0.063*** -0.132*** -0.281*** -0.225*** -0.103 -0.551***
Eq.2 -0.088*** -0.052*** -0.135*** -0.174*** -0.188*** -0.052 -0.273***
Eq.3 -0.092*** -0.055*** -0.202*** -0.188*** -0.183*** -0.135** -0.248***
Eq.4 -0.097*** -0.069*** -0.189*** -0.226*** -0.136*** -0.049 -0.553***
Eq.5 -0.097*** -0.057*** -0.215*** -0.198*** -0.207*** -0.066 -0.315***
Eq.6 -0.160*** -0.049** -0.211*** -0.233*** -0.269*** -0.120 -0.285**
Eq.7 -0.980*** -0.003** -0.134*** -0.227*** -0.231*** -0.033 -0.414**
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% signi￿cance levels, respectively.
EM is the panel including emerging market economies.
.
We can now turn to the coef￿cient estimates, which are displayed in Table 3 and in the Appendix
C. GDP per capita enters the long-run relationship with the expected positive sign for the OECD
and the emerging market panels. This result is particularly robust for small OECD and emerging
market economies, with the size of the coef￿cient usually lying somewhere between 0.4 and 1.0
for most of the alternative speci￿cations. However, less robustness is found for the transition
countries. This holds especially true for the CEE-5, for which GDP per capita turns out to be
insigni￿cant both in the baseline and in alternative speci￿cations. Although cointegration could not
be ￿rmly established for the Baltic countries, it is worth mentioning that GDP per capita is usually
statistically signi￿cant for this group as well as for the SEE-3. The fact that the coef￿cients’ size
largely exceeds unity re￿ects the upward bias due to quick adjustment toward equilibrium. The
results furthermore indicate that the bias is substantially larger for the Baltic countries than for the
SEE-3.
With regard to credit to the public sector, the estimations provide us with some interesting
insights, as an increase (decrease) in credit to the public sector is found to cause a decline (rise)
in private credit. This result is very robust for emerging market economies and for the CEE-5,
20as the coef￿cient estimates are almost always negative and statistically signi￿cant across different
speci￿cations. This lends support to the crowding-out/crowding-in hypothesis in these countries.
Some empirical support for this hypothesis can be also established for the advanced OECD and
for emerging market economies. By contrast, the estimated coef￿cients are either not signi￿cant
or have a positive sign for the Baltic countries and for the SEE-3. This ￿nding potentially mirrors
the very low levels of public indebtedness of the three Baltic countries.
Let us now take a closer look at the nominal interest rate and at the in￿ation rate. In accordance
with the results shown in Table 3 and in the Appendix C, there is reasonably robust empirical
support for nominal lending rates being negatively linked to private credit in the CEE-5 as well
as in emerging markets and small OECD countries. In contrast, the ￿nding for the Baltic States
and the SEE-3 is that interest rates mostly have a positive sign if they turn out to be statistically
signi￿cant. Note that these results are not really affected by the use of lending rates or short-term
interest rates.
For emerging economies from Asia and the Americas, particularly strong negative relationships
are detected between the rate of in￿ation and private credit. Although less stable across different
speci￿cationsandestimationmethods, thisnegativerelationshipbetweenin￿ationandcreditisalso
supported by the data for the CEE-5 and for small OECD economies. By contrast, no systematic
pattern could be revealed for the Baltic and Southeastern European countries.
Anincreasein￿nancialliberalization, measuredbyadeclineinspread, hastheexpectedpositive
impact on private credit in small OECD economies and in the CEE-5, and also to some extent in
the other transition economies. By contrast, the results for the ￿nancial liberalization index are
less robust. Although the ￿nancial liberalization index is positively associated with private credit
in OECD and emerging economies, it has an unexpected negative sign for all transition economies.
An explanation for this may be the delay with which ￿nancial liberalization measured by this
index is transmitted to private credit, whereas the spread variable captures the effective result of
￿nancial liberalization. The same mismatch between OECD and transition economies can be seen
21for private and public credit registries. While changes in credit registries produce the expected
effect on private credit in OECD countries, the estimation results show the opposite happening in
the transition economies.
22Table 3. Estimation Results ￿ Baseline Speci￿cation
V ector = X￿
0
CP = f(CAPITA;CG;ilending;pPPI;spread);￿
0 = [1;￿1;￿2;￿3;￿4;￿5]
expected signs: [1;+;￿;￿;￿;￿]
￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿4 ￿5
Large OECD
FE_OLS 0.422*** -0.198*** -0.028 -0.394* -0.050***
DOLS 0.391*** -0.034*** 0.120*** 0.241 0.171***
MGE 0.040 0.118 -0.016 -2.611** 0.207*
Small OECD
FE_OLS 0.480*** -0.170*** -0.068*** -0.178 -0.037***
DOLS 0.540*** -0.065*** -0.082 0.678*** -0.143***
MGE 0.643*** 0.057 -0.171 -1.272 0.281
Emerging market economies
FE_OLS 0.492*** -0.120*** 0.136*** -0.263*** 0.069**
DOLS 0.715*** -0.064*** 0.187*** -0.436*** -0.001
MGE 0.583*** -0.386*** 0.454 -0.492*** -1.172
CEE-11
FE_OLS 1.648*** 0.053** 0.297*** -0.046 -0.640***
DOLS 0.981*** -0.169*** 0.125 -0.105 -0.382***
MGE 2.043 -0.114 -0.027*** -0.263 -0.907**
CEE-5
FE_OLS 0.169 -0.276*** -0.031 -1.179*** -0.407***
DOLS 0.375*** -0.308*** -0.046 1.062*** -0.109*
MGE -1.076 -0.222*** -0.057*** 1.501 -0.985**
B-3
FE_OLS 2.554*** 0.024 0.369*** 0.396* -0.458***
DOLS 2.227*** -0.121 0.083** -1.676*** -0.481***
MGE 4.045 0.313 -0.124*** -2.852 -1.466
SEE
FE_OLS 2.049*** 0.455*** 0.218*** -0.102** -0.366***
DOLS 0.745*** 0.013 -0.298 -0.479 -0.737***
MGE 1.654*** 0.264 0.120 -0.616** 0.217
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% signi￿cance
levels, respectively. M is the panel including emerging market economies.
Because data on house prices are available only for developed OECD countries and for four
transition economies (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania), the estimations are
23performed only for large and small OECD and transition economies. In addition, we constructed
a panel including countries exhibiting large and persistent increases in house prices over the late
1990s, possibly indicating the build-up of a real estate bubble (Canada, Spain, France, the UK and
the USA.). The results are not particularly robust for the small and large OECD economies, as
the coef￿cient on house prices changes sign across different estimation methods (Table 4). For
transition economies, even though the results are somewhat more encouraging, as the coef￿cient is
always positively signed if it is found to be statistically signi￿cant, the estimated equations seem
to be rather fragile in general.
Table 4. Estimation Results ￿ Equation 8; Housing Prices
V ector = X￿
0
CP = f(CAPITA;CG;ilending;pPPI;spread;phousing);￿
0 = [1;￿1;￿2;￿3;￿4;￿5;￿6]
expected signs: [1;+;￿;￿;￿;￿;+]
￿ ￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿4 ￿5 ￿6
Small OECD economies
FE_OLS 0.611*** -0.166*** -0.098*** -0.125 -0.010 -0.062**
DOLS 0.286*** -0.064 -0.043 0.086 -0.081 0.399***
MGE -0.207*** 0.033 0.203*** -0.277** -0.548 -0.080 0.587***
Large OECD countries
FE_OLS 0.078* -0.209*** -0.022 -0.855*** 0.007 0.290***
DOLS 0.395*** -0.079*** -0.041* -0.345 -0.040 -0.161**
MGE -0.181*** -0.360 -0.049 -0.097* -2.397*** 0.139 0.544**
OECD economies with high growth rates in housing prices
FE_OLS 0.111* -0.160*** -0.066** -0.787*** -0.025 0.336***
DOLS 0.334*** -0.171*** -0.043** -0.412 0.022 0.040*
MGE -0.176*** -0.838 -0.146*** -0.235** -2.404** 0.432* 0.745**
CEE-4
FE_OLS 0.316 -0.429*** 0.032 -0.603*** -0.096 0.541***
DOLS 0.010*** -0.042*** 0.050 -0.563** 0.002 -0.018
MGE -0.125*** -0.651 -0.136*** -0.599*** 0.080 -0.359 0.561**
Note:￿ is the error correction term. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signi￿cance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% signi￿cance levels, respectively.
Now, if we look at the group of countries with large increases in house prices, it turns out that
house prices are positively correlated in a robust fashion with private credit, and that the other
24coef￿cient estimates are also in line with our earlier ￿ndings. However, the fact that the inclusion
of house prices yields robust results only if large increases have taken place on the property markets
might suggest that house prices mostly matter for private credit in the event of a possible housing
market bubble.
5.2 Deviations from the Estimated Equilibrium Levels
We now turn to the comparison of the ￿tted values from the panel estimations for the transition
economies to the observed values for the transition economies. This exercise makes it possible to
see how far away the observed private credit-to-GDP ratio is from the estimated long-term value.
As both the estimated long-run coef￿cients and the constant terms might be biased because of the
possibility of a large initial undershooting followed by a steady adjustment toward equilibrium
in transition economies, which is partly con￿rmed in Table 3, we are cautious about the use of
in-sample panel estimates, i.e. about using the coef￿cient estimates obtained for the transition
panels. However, more importantly, it is the lack of robustness of the coef￿cient estimates for the
transition economies that prevents us from relying on the in-sample panel estimations. As Tables
3 and 4 and in the Appendix C show, there is no single equation for transition economies in which
all coef￿cients are statistically signi￿cant and have the expected sign.
21
To overcome this problem, we could apply the out-of sample analysis, using two groups of
countries, namely emerging market economies and OECD countries. Emerging market economies
might be expected to provide a natural benchmark for CEE economies. However, the fact that some
of the coef￿cient estimates for this panel are not signi￿cant or, importantly, have the wrong sign
these countries cannot be used as a benchmark. Therefore, we have experimented with a smaller
panel including only small emerging markets (Chile, Israel, Peru and South Africa) which could
21 Note that the analogy with the literature on equilibrium exchange rates in transition economies ends here, given that
it is possible to establish robust relationships between the real exchange rate and its most important fundamentals,
such as for instance productivity (see e.g. ￿gert, Halpern and MacDonald, 2006).
25constitute a more meaningful benchmark, given the comparability of size and GDP per capita.
Yet the coef￿cient estimates (not reported here) do not improve as the coef￿cients on credit to the
government, the interest rate and the spread variable are either insigni￿cant or have the wrong sign.
As a result, we are left with the OECD panels. The baseline speci￿cation estimated by means
of ￿xed effect OLS for small open OECD economies
22 appears to be best suited, as this is the
only equation where all coef￿cients bear the right sign and all but one are statistically signi￿cant
(marked in green in Table 3).
23
When engaging in an out-of-sample exercise, i.e. using the coef￿cient estimates obtained for the
small open OECD panel to derive the ￿tted value for transition economies, the underlying assump-
tion is that in the long run there is parameter homogeneity between the small developed OECD
panel and the transition countries. One might reasonably assume that in the long run (after adjust-
ment toward equilibrium is completed) the behavior of transition economies will be similar to the
present behavior of small OECD countries. Even though this homogeneity is ful￿lled between the
two samples, the estimated long-run values of the private credit-to-GDP ratio and the underlying
deviation from equilibrium should be interpreted from a long-run perspective.
Given that no country-speci￿c constant terms are available for the transition economies, the next
intricate issue is how constant terms should be applied to derive the ￿tted values.
24 Our safest bet
22 Small OECD countries appear to be a reasonably useful benchmark, at least with respect to longer-term equilibrium
levels. It should be noted that CEE countries have undergone a substantial convergence to small OECD countries
in structural and institutional terms. As a consequence, four of these countries - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovakia - joined the OECD in the second half of the 1990s. Likewise, the EBRD transition indicators (see
EBRD 2005), the standard reference point for gauging progress with the structural and institutional change in CEE
countries, show that the countries under review in this study, in particular the Central European and Baltic countries,
plus Croatia, have made substantial progress towards fully-￿edged market economies already in the second half of
the 1990s, while gradually advancing further in more recent years.
23 Given that this relationship may have undergone some changes over time, we carried out estimations for the follow-
ing subperiods: 1980-2004; 1985-2004 and 1990-2004. The coef￿cients do not change much both in terms of
size and signi￿cance with the exception of the spread variable which becomes insigni￿cant for 1985-2004 and for
1990-2004. Therefore, the estimation obtained for the whole period seems reasonably stable and thus suitable for pro-
ceeding further with the analysis. We also carried out estimations for a panel composed of catching-up EU coun-
tries (Greece, Portugal and Spain). However, the results (not reported here) appear to be not very robust.
24 Note that Cottarelli et al. (2005), the ￿rst paper which derives the equilibrium level of private credit for transition
economies, does not address the issue of the constant terms.
26is to use the largest and the smallest constant terms (as well as the median constant term) obtained
on the basis of the small OECD panel, which gives us the whole spectrum of possible estimated
values for private credit.
25
The derived range of deviation is plotted on Chart 4. The error margin is, however, rather
large. Consequently, if one considers midpoints, Croatia is now the only country which might have
reached equilibrium by 2004. When looking at whole ranges, other countries, namely Bulgaria,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia, might have already reached equilibrium as well, while the
mass of the estimated deviation was still located mostly on the undershooting side in 2004. At the
same time, the upper edges of the estimated band come close to equilibrium for Hungary, Bulgaria,
Poland and Slovenia. Moreover, it turns out that the initial overshooting might not have been that
large for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, after all. Finally, it is interesting to see that the initial
undershooting remains relatively stable for Lithuania, Poland and Romania throughout the period.
25 Another reason for selecting the baseline speci￿cation is that the variables included are all expressed in levels,
which ensures that the constant terms derived on this basis have a cross-sectional meaning. For instance, the constants
would not have any cross-sectional meaning if indices with a base year were used (e.g. for industrial production
or house prices).
27Chart 4. Deviations from Long-Run Equilibrium Credit-to-GDP, 1990 to 2004
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Central and Eastern Europe - 5
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South Eastern Europe
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Note: negative values indicate that the observed private credit to GDP ratio is lower than
what a particular country’s GDP per capita would predict (￿undervaluation￿)
Conversely, positive ￿gures show an ￿overvaluation￿ of the private credit to GDP ratio.
One explanation for the initial undershooting observed for the countries under study is the low
share of credit to households in total domestic credit. Chart 5 hereafter shows the importance of
credit to households was substantially lower in transition economies than in the euro area in 1999.
Nevertheless, a relative increase in credit to households can be observed over the last 7 years or so,
in particular in countries where an adjustment towards equilibrium is shown on chart 4.
28Chart 5. Share of Credit to Households in Total Domestic Credit
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the equilibrium level of private credit to GDP in 11 transition
economies from CEE on the basis of a number of dynamic panels containing quarterly data for
transition economies, developed OECD economies and emerging markets, and relying on a frame-
work including both factors that capture the demand for and the supply of private credit.
Credit to the public sector (crowding out/crowding in), nominal interest rates, the in￿ation rate
and the spread between lending and deposit rates aimed at capturing ￿nancial liberalization and
competition in the banking sector turn out to be the major determinants of credit growth in the
CEE-5, while GDP per capita is the only variable that enters the estimated equations in a robust
manner for the Baltic and Southeastern European countries. Furthermore, we ￿nd the estimated
coef￿cients for transition economies are much higher than those obtained for OECD and emerging
market economies, which testi￿es to the bias caused by the initial undershooting of private credit
to GDP in most countries. Another interesting result is that house prices are found to lead to an
increase in private credit only in countries with high house price in￿ation. This ￿nding disquali￿es
29the house price variable from being included in the long-run equation to be used for the derivation
of the equilibrium level of private credit.
Wehaveemphasizedthatrelyingonin-samplepanelestimatesoftheequilibriumlevelofprivate
credit for transition economies is problematic not only because of the possible bias which shows
up in the estimated coef￿cients due to the initial undershooting, but also because the equations
estimated for transition economies are not suf￿ciently stable. To overcome these problems, we
used small open OECD countries as a benchmark to derive the equilibrium level of private credit
for transition economies as our intention to use the emerging markets panel as the benchmark was
thwarted by the lack of robustness of the empirical results. Another reason for using the small
OECD panel as a benchmark is the following. Transition economies are expected to converge in
behavior to this panel in the longer run. Hence, such a panel provides us with coef￿cient estimates
that can be used to infer equilibrium credit-to-GDP ratios which apply in the long run for transition
economies.
We can draw some general conclusions with regard to undershooting and overshooting for tran-
sition economies, even though the application of the out-of-sample small open OECD panel to
transition economies yields a wide corridor of deviations from the equilibrium. Considering the
midpoint of the estimated interval, Croatia is the only country which might have reached the equi-
librium by 2004. When looking at whole ranges, the upper edges of the estimated band reached
equilibrium in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia, although the mass of the estimated
deviation was still located mostly on the undershooting side in 2004. Moreover, it turns out that the
initial overshooting might not have been that large for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, after all.
Finally, it is interesting to see that the initial undershooting remains relatively stable for Lithuania,
Poland and Romania throughout the period. Overall, our results suggest that the CEE countries
cannot be generally regarded as (over)shooting stars in terms of their credit-to-GDP ratios despite
robust credit growth observed in most of the countries. However, Croatia seems to outcompete
the other countries in the pursuit of the title of an (over)shooting star, albeit Bulgaria, Estonia,
30Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia are still trying hard to ￿ght back.
The prospects for the future are that credit growth will very likely remain rapid in CEE or
to accelerate further in those countries where it is still comparatively moderate, given that the
underlying factors which support private sector credit dynamics will remain at work for some time
to come. As experience shows, the rapid pace of credit expansion and its persistence in a number of
countriesdoesbyitselfposetheriskofadeteriorationofassetquality. Moreover, itexposeslenders
and borrowers to risks because of an increase in unhedged foreign currency lending. Furthermore,
the rapid adjustment process toward equilibrium levels may trigger demand booms, causing current
account de￿cits to move above levels that can be sustained over a longer period of time. However,
we leave it to future research to determine empirically the optimal speed of adjustment toward
equilibrium that does not jeopardize macroeconomic and ￿nancial stability.
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348 Appendix
8.1 Data Appendix
8.1.1 Data Sources and De￿nitions
Quarterly data for bank credit to the private sector, credit to the government sector, short-term and
long-term interest rate series, the consumer and producer price indices (CPI and PPI), real and
nominal GDP, and industrial production are obtained from the International Financial Statistics of
the IMF accessed via the database of the Austrian Institute for Economic Research (WIFO).
26 For
some emerging markets, industrial production data is not available from this source, and hence
are obtained from national data sources. In￿ation is computed as a year-on-year rate (pt ￿ pt￿4).
Lending rates are based on bank lending rates, and wherever not available, long-term government
bond yields are used instead. Three-month treasury bill rates, and wherever not available, money
market rates, are employed for short-term interest rates. The spread is calculated using lending (or,
wherever not available, long-term government bond yields) and deposit rates.
GDP per capita expressed in PPS against the euro and the U.S. dollar is drawn from the AMECO
database of the European Commission and the World Economic Indicators of the World Bank,
respectively. The data start in 1975 for OECD countries and the emerging markets and in the 1990s
for transition economies. The data are linearly interpolated from annual to quarterly frequencies.
The ￿nancial liberalization index (from 0 to 20) reported in Abiad and Mody (2003) and used
in Cottarelli et al. (2005) is used for OECD and emerging market economies. The data cover
the period from 1975 to 1996 and are available for all emerging countries and for nine OECD
economies, namely the large OECD countries plus Canada, Australia and New Zealand. For the
transition economies, the average of the liberalization index of the banking sector and that of the
￿nancial sector provided by the EBRD from 1990 to 2004 are used (rescaled from the range 1 to
26 IFS codes: Bank credit to the private sector: lines 22d and 22g; credit to the government: lines 22a, 22b and
22c; interest rates: lines 60b, 60c, 60l, 60p and 61; CPI and PPI: lines 64 and 63; nominal GDP: lines 99b and
99b.c; real GDP: lines 99bvp and 99bvr; industrial production in industry: lines 66, 66..c and 66ey (in manufacturing).
354+ to the range 0 to 20, which corresponds to the scaling used in Abiad and Mody, 2003). The data
are linearly interpolated from annual to quarterly frequencies. Data for the existence of public and
private credit registries are taken from Djankov et al. (2005), who provide data for 1999 and 2003.
The series we use can take three values: 0 in the absence of both public and private registries; 1 if
either public or private credit registries are in operation and 2 if both exist. This variable basically
captures whether a change between 1999 and 2003 alters the supply of credit during this period.
GDP per capita, the ￿nancial liberalization index and the registry variable are transformed to a
quarterly frequency by means of linear interpolation.
House prices are not available for emerging countries and for Italy. For transition economies,
data could be obtained only for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania. Quarterly
data for the OECD economies are obtained from the Macroeconomic Database of the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) and Datastream. The source of the data is the respective central
banks for the Czech Republic, France, Hungary and Lithuania and the national statistical of￿ce for
Estonia.
8.1.2 The Span of the Data
Starting dates (the series end in 2004:q4 if not indicated otherwise)
Private credit (the same applies to public credit if not indicated otherwise in parentheses):
OECD: 1975:q1- 2004:q4;
Emergingmarkets: 1975:q1-2004:q4exceptforARG:1982:q3(1983:q3); BR:1988:q3(1989:q3);
INDO: 1980:q3; PE: 1984:q1 (1985:q1); TK: 1990:q1 (1987:q4)
Transition economies: HU, PL: 1990:Q4; BG, EE, SI: 1991:q4; LT: 1993:q1; LV: 1993:q3; CZ,
SK: 1993:q4; HR: 1993:q4 (1994:q2); EE: 1991; RO: 1996:q4.
Spread (in parentheses for spread2 if different):
OECD: 1975:q1 except for DE: 1977:q3; NO: 1979:q1; IE:1979:q3; FI, NE: 1981:q1; NZ:
1981:q4; ES: 1982:q1; IT: 1982:q3
36Emerging markets: INDO, KO, PH: 1975:q1; CH, TH: 1977:q1; SA: 1977:q4; IND, ME:
1978:q1; IS: 1983:q1; PE: 1988:q1; ARG: 1993:q2; BR: 1997:q1; TK: not available
Transition economies: HU, PL: 1990:q1; BG: 1991:q1; SI: 1991:q4; HR: 1992:q1; CZ, LT, SK:
1993:q1; EE: 1993:q2; LV: 1993:q3; RO: 1995:q4.
PPI (CPI, industrial production (IP), if different):
OECD: 1975:q1 except for PPI in NO, NZ: 1977:q1; BE: 1980:q1; IT: 1981:q1
Emerging markets: 1975:q1 except for ARG: 1987:q1 (1994:q1; NA); BR: 1992:q1 (1992:q1,
1991:q1); CH: 1976:q1 (1976:q1, 1975:q1); INDO: IP:1976:q1; IS: IP not available; KO: IP:
1980:q1; PE:1980:q1(1980:q1, 1979:q1); PH:1993:q1(1975:q1, 1981:q1); TK:1987:q1(1987:q1,
1980:q1)
Transitioneconomies: BG:1991:q1; CZ:1993:q1; HR:1993:q1; EE:1993:q1(1992:q1, 1993:q1);
HU: 1990:q1; LV: 1994: q1 (1992:q1,1993:q1); LT: 1993:q1; PL: 1991:q1; RO: 1992:q1; SK:
1991:q1 (1993:q1, 1990:q1); SI: 1992:q1.
Real GDP:
OECD: 1975:q1 except for BE: 1980:q1; DK, PT: 1977:q1 and NZ: 1982: q2
Emerging markets: IND, IS, KO: 1975:q1; CH, ME: 1980:q1; PE: 1979:q1; PH: 1981:q1; TK:
1987:q1; BR: 1990:q1; ARG, INDO, TH: 1993:q1
Transition economies: SI: 1992:q1; HR, EE, LV, LT, RO, SK: 1993:q1; CZ: 1994:q1, HU, PL:
1995:q1; Data for India and Romania are linearly interpolated from annual to quarterly frequency.
All series stop in 2004:q4.
GDP per capita in PPS:
Data based on the euro for transition economies: CZ, PL, RO: 1990; BG, HU, SI: 1991; LV, LT:
1992; EE, SK: 1993; HR: 1995
Data based on the USD for transition economies: HR, HU, PL, RO: 1990; BG, EE, LV, LT, SK,
SI: 1991; CZ: 1992.
37Housing prices:
OECD: The starting date of the series is as follows: DK, DE, NE, SUI, UK, US: 1975:q1; JP:
1977:q1; SA: 1980:q1; FR: 1980:q4; CA: 1981:q1; FI: 1983:q1; SE: 1986:q1; AUS: 1986:q2; ES:
1987:q1, AT: 1987:q2; PT: 1988:q1; NZ: 1989:q4; IE: 1990:q1; BE, NO: 1991:q4; GR: 1994:q1.
The series stop in 2004:q4.
Transitioneconomies: CZ:1999:q1-2004:q4; EE:1994:q2-2004:q4; HU:1991:q1-2004:q4; LT:
2000:q1-2004:q4
388.1.3 Estimation Results
Table A3. Estimation Results – Eq2 to Eq3
ip G C
lending i
PPI p spread gdpr G C
lending i
PPI p spread
Large OECD
FE_OLS 0.655*** -0.206*** -0.031 -1.643*** 0.013 0.557*** -0.202*** -0.055* -1.296*** -0.026
DOLS 0.925*** 0.018 0.143*** -0.635*** 0.120*** 0.700*** 0.023 0.184*** -0.897*** 0.158***
MGE 0.390 0.130 0.056 -3.480*** 0.364** 0.067 0.119 -0.022 -2.406** 0.316*
Small OECD
FE_OLS 0.767*** -0.115*** -0.089*** -0.888*** -0.134*** 1.163*** -0.099*** 0.029* -0.334*** -0.108***
DOLS 1.113*** -0.011 0.029** 0.024 0.038** 1.272*** 0.036** 0.038*** 0.306*** -0.119
MGE 2.533*** 0.254* 0.024 -2.903* 0.945** 2.111*** 0.018 0.101 -1.169 0.458
Emerging market economies
FE_OLS 0.483*** -0.097*** 0.078*** -0.416*** -0.003 0.419*** -0.119*** 0.097*** -0.150** 0.019
DOLS 0.589*** -0.006*** 0.077*** -0.503*** -0.201*** 0.729*** -0.030*** 0.133*** -0.212* -0.148***
MGE 0.502*** -0.253*** 0.867 -0.333*** -0.555 0.109*** -0.089*** 0.885** -0.908** -0.986
CEE-5
FE_OLS -0.105 -0.293*** -0.181*** -1.202*** -0.379*** 0.639*** -0.282*** -0.086 -1.018*** -0.472***
DOLS 0.158 -0.347*** -0.050 0.848*** -0.121** 0.980*** -0.109 0.089 1.012*** -0.198***
MGE -1.088* -0.467*** -0.830** 1.030 -1.157 0.830 0.065 -0.067*** 0.056 -0.587*
B-3
FE_OLS 1.589*** -0.004 -0.290*** 0.621* -0.463*** 2.771*** 0.006 0.128 0.411 -0.376***
DOLS 1.905*** -0.087 0.371*** -3.927*** 0.709*** 3.169*** -0.076 0.423*** -1.885*** -0.184
MGE 1.198 2.772** -2.259 -3.632*** 0.827 12.374** 1.258* -0.757 -4.716*** -1.985
SEE
FE_OLS 0.908*** 0.096 -0.729 0.166 -1.349*** 3.464*** 0.129 0.308** -1.920*** 0.159
DOLS 0.973*** 0.110 -0.682 0.140 -1.247*** 3.464*** 0.129 0.308** -1.920*** 0.159
MGE 2.174** -0.197 0.091 -1.799 0.722 4.023*** -0.145 0.431 -2.743** 0.231
Notes: *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. See also Table 4.
Table A4. Estimation Results – Eq4 to Eq5
capita G C
term short i
- PPI p spread capita G C
lending i
CPI p spread
Large OECD
FE_OLS 0.426*** -0.202*** 0.027 -0.520** 0.005 0.362*** -0.201*** 0.037 -1.687*** -0.024
DOLS 0.412*** -0.002*** 0.071*** 0.122 0.206** 0.361*** -0.025*** 0.177*** -0.681** 0.155***
MGE 0.007 0.147 0.097 -2.471** 0.288*** 0.044 0.150 0.088 -2.788*** 0.198**
Small OECD
FE_OLS 0.501*** -0.177*** -0.054*** -0.173 -0.045*** 0.544*** -0.157*** -0.110*** 1.181*** -0.039***
DOLS 0.447*** -0.085*** -0.105*** 0.741*** -0.112*** 0.626*** -0.002*** -0.149*** 1.645*** -0.165***
MGE 0.686*** 0.045 -0.060 -0.103 0.222 0.756*** 0.573* -0.165 -1.196 -0.592
Emerging market economies
FE_OLS 0.508*** -0.237*** 0.004 0.115* 0.112*** 0.485*** -0.082*** 0.143*** -0.414*** 0.065*
DOLS 0.621*** -0.049*** -0.089 0.319* 0.023 0.716*** -0.032*** 0.041* -0.327*** -0.018
MGE 0.426*** -0.521*** -0.360 -0.852 -1.352 0.813*** -0.034*** 0.239 -1.171*** -0.176
CEE-5
FE_OLS 0.102 -0.288*** -0.085** -1.154*** -0.476*** 0.210 -0.272*** 0.005 -1.095*** -0.412***
DOLS -0.280 -0.272*** 0.040 0.211 -0.057 0.207** -0.263*** -0.135 0.467** -0.296***
MGE 0.019 -0.216** -0.105*** -0.729 -0.619 -5.367* -0.401*** -0.776*** -12.111 -3.641**
B-3
FE_OLS 2.148*** 0.021 0.217*** 0.581** -0.192** 2.611*** 0.005 0.479*** -0.385* -0.522***
DOLS 2.183*** -0.179 0.002 -1.625*** -0.337 2.018*** 0.121 0.160*** -1.375*** -0.011
MGE 4.174 0.313 -0.759 -5.100** -1.178* -3.755 0.285 -0.344 -7.268 -0.905
SEE
FE_OLS 0.678*** 0.009 -0.354 -0.953** -1.024*** 1.217*** 0.073 -0.024 0.099 -0.463***
DOLS 0.678*** 0.009 -0.354 -0.953** -1.024*** 1.217*** 0.073 -0.024 0.099 -0.463***
MGE 1.539*** 0.284 0.058 -0.654** -0.204 0.911** 0.548 -0.546 -0.112 0.245
Notes: See Table A3.
39Table A5. Estimation Results – Equation 6 to Equation 7
capita G C term long i - PPI p finlib capita G C term long i - PPI p spread reg
Large OECD
FE_OLS 0.381*** -0.285*** 0.015 0.022 0.111*** 0.484*** -0.174*** -0.067*** -0.165 -0.036*** 0.236***
DOLS 0.435*** 0.012 0.122*** -0.660*** -0.304*** 0.180*** -0.006 0.059*** -0.120 0.025 0.042
MGE 0.405 0.041 0.160 -0.583*** 0.084 -0.237 0.144 -0.089 -1.365 0.088 -0.064
Small OECD
FE_OLS 0.483*** -0.088*** -0.131*** 0.192 0.223*** 0.484*** -0.174*** -0.067*** -0.165 -0.036*** 0.236***
DOLS 2.337*** -2.619* 2.274 2.076 4.722 0.059*** 0.006 0.024*** 0.006 0.008 0.011
MGE 1.077 -0.283 -0.463 -0.638 0.307*** 0.038 0.074 0.005 -0.209 0.024 -0.015
Emerging market economies
FE_OLS 0.269*** 0.069*** -0.035** 0.137*** 0.302*** -- -- -- -- -- --
DOLS 3.081*** -3.117*** 2.640 -2.313*** 5.679 -- -- -- -- -- --
MGE 1.084 -1.846 -0.152** -0.379 0.141** -- -- -- -- -- --
CEE-5
FE_OLS 0.663*** -0.298*** -0.008 -1.412*** -0.985*** 0.220* -0.257*** -0.011 -1.096*** -0.208* -0.119**
DOLS 0.906*** -0.408*** -0.121 0.698 -1.304*** 0.253** -0.068 0.222*** 0.104 -0.069 -0.146***
MGE -19.708 -1.645** -8.252*** 2.034 -4.405 0.139 0.015 0.232** -0.183 0.001** -0.170***
B-3
FE_OLS 2.713*** -0.085* 0.485*** 0.694** -0.013 2.580*** 0.012 0.412*** 0.619** -0.394*** 0.157
DOLS 2.002*** 0.123 0.135* -1.924*** -0.041 0.439 0.254** 0.152*** -1.739** 0.017 -0.005***
MGE 2.828 0.353 -0.735*** -2.427 -0.312*** 0.377 0.640* 0.500 -4.486 0.767 -0.565**
SEE
FE_OLS 1.792*** 0.053* 0.101 -0.221 -3.087*** 1.919 0.182** 0.120*** 0.334 -0.828*** -0.269***
DOLS 1.792*** 0.053* 0.101 -0.221 -3.087*** 1.919 0.182** 0.120*** 0.334 -0.828*** -0.269***
MGE 2.523** -0.432 1.600** -1.588** -0.160 4.965*** 0.470*** 1.015*** -0.907*** 0.112 -0.577***
Notes: See Table A3.
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